The Role of Tradable Permits in Water Pollution Control by Eduard Interweis et al.
The Role of Tradable Permits
in Water Pollution Control
R. Andreas Kraemer
Eleftheria Kampa
Eduard Interwies
Ecologic, Institute for International and European Environmental Policy
Pfalzburger Strasse 43-44, 10717 Berlin, Germany, http://www.ecologic.de
Tel. +49 30 86880-0; Fax: +49 30 86880-100; Kraemer@Ecologic.de
Avenue des Gaulois/Galliërslaan 18, 1040 Bruxelles/Brussel, Belgium
2Table of Content
Pages
1 Summary ............................................................................................................................. 3
2 Background and Rationale .................................................................................................. 4
2.1 Background and Purpose........................................................................................ 4
2.2 Scope of Paper........................................................................................................ 4
2.3 Structure of Paper ................................................................................................... 5
3 Economic Instruments in Water Management: What Role for Tradable Rights? .............. 5
3.1 Taxonomy of Economic Instruments for Water Management ................................ 5
3.1.1 Abstraction Taxes ......................................................................................... 7
3.1.2 Water Prices ................................................................................................. 7
3.1.3 Sewerage Charges (Indirect Emissions) ..................................................... 8
3.1.4 Effluent Charges ........................................................................................... 8
3.1.5 Subsidies ...................................................................................................... 8
3.2 Tradable Permits for Water Management............................................................. 10
3.2.1 Tradable water abstraction rights ............................................................... 11
3.2.2 Tradable permits to water-based resources .............................................. 12
3.2.3 Tradable water pollution rights ................................................................... 12
4 Tradable Water Pollution Rights: the International Experience........................................ 14
4.1 Salinity Trading ...................................................................................................... 15
4.1.1 Inter-State Salinity Trading Case: Murray-Darling Basin (Australia) ......... 15
4.1.2 Salt Pollution Trading Case: Hunter River (Australia)................................ 16
4.2 Trading of Organic Pollution Rights ...................................................................... 17
4.2.1 Organic Point Source Trading Case: Fox River, Wisconsin (USA) ........... 18
4.3 Trading of Nutrient Pollution Rights ...................................................................... 19
4.3.1 Hawkesbury-Nepean River (Australia) ....................................................... 20
4.3.2 Tar-Pamlico River, North Carolina (USA)................................................... 21
4.3.3 Lake Dillon, Colorado (USA)....................................................................... 22
4.3.4 Cherry Creek, Colorado (USA) ................................................................... 23
4.3.5 Chesapeake Bay (USA).............................................................................. 23
5 Lessons Learned on Tradable Water Pollution Rights ..................................................... 25
6 Applying Tradable Pollution Rights in Water Management .............................................. 26
6.1 Strategies for Introducing Tradable Pollution Rights Regimes ............................ 26
6.2 Opportunities and Limitations................................................................................ 28
6.3 Compatibility of Tradable Pollution Permit Regimes in Instrument Mixes............ 30
6.3.1 Compatibility with taxes and charges ......................................................... 30
6.3.2 Compatibility with environmental quality objectives (EQO)....................... 31
6.3.3 Compatibility with technology-derived standards (BAT) ............................ 31
6.3.4 Compatibility with established principles of environmental policy ............. 32
6.3.5 Tradable pollution permits within instrument mixes ................................... 32
7 Conclusion and Overall Assessment ................................................................................ 32
8 Bibliography....................................................................................................................... 34
31 SUMMARY
This paper was prepared as a conceptual framework to stimulate discussions on the role and
applicability of tradable permits in water pollution control among participants of the Technical
Seminar on the Feasibility of the Application of Tradable Water Permits for Water
Management in Chile (13-14 November 2003 in Santiago de Chile). In Chile, water pollution
is a major problem. Until recently, existing regulations to control water pollution consisted
mainly of non-market based instruments. Innovative instruments are now being explored via
a recent national law for tradable emission/discharge permits.
The instrument of tradable discharge permits is one of several market-based instruments
used in water management and pollution control. Tradable discharge permits are actually
among the most challenging market-based instruments in terms of both their design and
implementation. Experience to date with tradable discharge permits for water pollution
control has been limited and mainly comes from several regions of the US and Australia.
The paper at first introduces tradable permits as part of an overall taxonomy of economic
instruments in the field of water management. In this context, three fundamentally different
fields of application of tradable permits systems relating to water are presented: tradable
water abstraction rights, tradable rights to water-based resources and tradable water
pollution rights. The remaining of the paper deals exclusively with the latter category, i.e.
tradable water pollution rights, their role and applicability in water pollution control.
The authors provide literature-based empirical evidence of the international experience with
tradable water pollution rights (case studies from the US and Australia). The practical
examples are presented according to different individual substances or parameters that have
been the subject of trading systems (salinity, organic pollution and nutrient pollution).
Lessons are drawn from the selected examples considering also the institutional and existing
regulatory context of the countries in question.
Subsequently, the authors make recommendations on the strategies for introducing tradable
water pollution rights, they point out opportunities and limitations and discuss the
instrument’s compatibility in instrument ‘mixes’. The paper focuses on the specificity of water
pollution trading discussing outstanding issues that should be considered for the introduction
of tradable water pollution rights. For a systematic analysis of the various approaches and
challenges relating to the overall design and implementation of tradable permits for natural
resources at the national level, the reader should refer to the study of the OECD (2001).
It is pointed out that experience with tradable permits for water pollution control has been
accumulating primarily in advanced economies with long regulatory history in water
management and pollution control (the US and Australia). The introduction of trade for water
pollution control has benefited in these cases from solid scientific understanding of the
pollution problems in question, existing monitoring infrastructure and enforcement capacities.
It is important to bear in mind that the pre-existing (institutional and regulatory) context may
be different in other countries or regions where trading schemes are being considered.
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2.1 Background and Purpose
This paper on the role of tradable permits in water pollution control was prepared for the
Technical Seminar on the Feasibility of the Application of Tradable Water Permits for Water
Management in Chile, organized by the Inter-American Development Bank (IADB) and the
National Environment Commission of Chile (CONAMA), on 13-14 November 2003 in
Santiago de Chile. The objective of the Technical Seminar was to analyze and discuss
international experiences on the implementation of tradable discharge permit schemes (a
market-based instrument for pollution control) and evaluate the feasibility of their application
in Chile.
Overall, early attempts to control water pollution followed a regulatory command-and-control
approach. In many cases, the regulatory approach has led to the reduction of water pollution.
Recently, there is a growing move from command-and-control to various market-based
instruments in order to achieve further water pollution control. This is partly due to the fact
that the cheapest and easiest-to-achieve point source reductions have occurred via
regulatory command-and-control instruments, leading now to an escalation of costs to meet
tougher water quality standards. Moreover, non-point source pollution, which is becoming a
significant water pollution source, is not easily controlled by regulation.
The instrument of tradable discharge permits is one of several market-based instruments
used in water management and pollution control; tradable discharge permits are actually
among the most challenging ones in terms of both their design and implementation.
Experience to date with tradable discharge permits for water pollution control has been
limited and mainly comes from countries with an advanced economy such as the US and
Australia.
In Chile water pollution is a major problem. Until recently, existing regulations consisted
mainly of non-market based instruments. There are ambient water quality standards,
standards for the discharge of liquid waste into sewer systems and watercourses. Several
bans on the discharge of polluted waters into rivers and other waters used as source for
irrigation or drinking water have also been in place but their enforcement  has been weak
(Huber et al., 1998). Innovative instruments are now being explored via a recent national law
for tradable emission permits in Chile.
2.2 Scope of Paper
In this context, this paper was prepared as a conceptual framework to stimulate discussions
among participants of the Technical Seminar on the role and applicability of tradable permits
in water pollution control. Based on literature, it provides an overview of recent developments
on the wider international application of tradable permits in water pollution (US, Australia). It
builds to a great extent on the findings of Kraemer and Banholzer (1999) and Kraemer et al.
(2002) on the use of tradable permits in water management and pollution control providing
some updates of the trading programmes reviewed in this previous work. The description
and discussion of each programme of tradable permits attempts to cover in brief information
on the institutional set up of the programme, its establishment, as well as on the nature of
permits, programme participants, allocation method and monitoring of the trading rules.
5Comments on the advantages and potential drawbacks of each scheme are also included
where appropriate.
Apart from reviewing the relevant international experience, the paper makes recom-
mendations on the strategies for introducing tradable water discharge permits and discusses
their compatibility with other regulatory instruments. The paper does not attempt an
extensive discussion on the design and implementation of a tradable permit system for
natural resources within a country. For information on the overall design and implementation
of tradable permits for environmental management, the reader should refer to the study of
the OECD (2001). We focus on the specificity of water pollution trading discussing out-
standing issues that should be considered for the introduction of tradable water pollution
rights.
Therefore, the main objectives of this paper are to:
· Give an introduction to the role of tradable permits in the field of water management, as
part of an overall taxonomy of other relevant economic instruments;
· provide empirical evidence of international experience with tradable permits for water
pollution control (US, Australia);
· provide a conceptual framework for the application of tradable permits for water pollution
control.
2.3 Structure of Paper
The paper is structured as follows: Section 1 and 2 have given a summary of the report and
have set the background and scope respectively. Section 3 discusses the role of tradable
permits in water management and pollution control, in the context of an overall taxonomy of
relevant economic instruments. Section 4 presents a number of case studies from the
international arena on tradable permits for water pollution control. Section 5 then discusses
the application of tradable water pollution rights elaborating on opportunities and limitations,
strategies for their introduction as well as their compatibility in instrument mixes. Section 6
finally concludes with remarks on the use of tradable permits in water pollution control so far
and their potential for further application.
3 ECONOMIC INSTRUMENTS IN WATER MANAGEMENT: WHAT ROLE FOR TRADABLE RIGHTS?
This section provides a taxonomy of economic instruments in water management, introduces
the available instruments and defines their areas of applicability. The taxonomy is followed
by a more detailed sub-section on the economic instrument of tradable permits for water
management, as background to the relevant international experience presented in the next
section of the paper.
3.1 Taxonomy of Economic Instruments for Water Management
The taxonomy presented in this sub-section is mainly based on the work of Kraemer et al.
(2003). Figure 1 positions the respective economic instruments along the water cycle. The
different aspects of the figure are explained in the following subsections.
6Figure 1: Economic Instruments for Water Management (adapted from Kraemer, 1995a)
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73.1.1 Abstraction Taxes
A water abstraction tax is a certain amount of money charged for the direct abstraction of
water from ground or surface water (Roth, 2001). In some cases only ground water
abstractions are charged to reduce the price differential between surface and groundwater
abstraction, while in others, both ground and surface water abstractions are taxed, however
often at different rates.
Besides their revenue-generating function, water abstraction taxes can act as incentive
measures. Effective water abstraction taxes can induce a change in user behavior resulting
in lower water demand and a reduction of water leakage. If the tax is set to reflect marginal –
(environmental or resource) - costs of water abstraction, it enhances the cost effectiveness of
the service provided. In general, water abstraction policies should consider both surface and
groundwater in order to limit negative effects that more efficient pricing for one source of
water will have on the other (European Commission, 2000a).
In many countries, revenues generated by abstraction charges are earmarked for explicit
water management purposes, so that the proceeds from the tax are indirectly returned to
those liable to pay. Water abstraction taxes may be set to reflect the relative scarcity of water
and may vary by regions.
3.1.2 Water Prices
The instrument of water pricing has the primary goal of financing water supply infrastructure.
According to the European Commission (2000b), water prices should be set at a level that
ensures the recovery of costs for each sector (agriculture, households and industry) and to
allocate costs to those sectors (avoidance of cross-subsidies). Water prices should in
principle relate to three types of cost – direct economic costs, social costs, and
environmental (and resource) costs. The estimation of each type of costs involves a different
set of problems (Kraemer and Buck, 1997):
- Direct economic costs: Full recovery of the economic costs of water services will require
that water prices include (1) the costs of operation and maintenance of water
infrastructure, (2) the capital costs for the construction of this water infrastructure, and (3)
the reserves for future investment in water infrastructure.
- Social costs : With respect to water services, the direct or indirect social benefits (for
instance in the field of public health) vary largely with respect to the specific contextual
settings. Calculating these costs and comparing them across cases is, therefore, not a
feasible task, which prohibits their incorporation into a comparative study.
- Environmental costs : The environmental costs of a certain economic activity are
generally not reflected in the prices established at the market-place, but appear as so-
called externalities. Conceptually, the non-inclusion of negative environmental costs in
price mechanisms can be discussed under the heading of subsidies. In practice though,
there are great difficulties linked to the establishment of benchmarks for costs caused by
environmental degradation, and to the inclusion of these costs into market-based
mechanisms. Still, the principle of full cost recovery requires taking these costs into
account. Given the methodological problems involved in calculating environmental
8externalities, the inclusion of an environmental component into water prices will be
backed by political rather than economic arguments.
In addition to their financing function, water pricing policies often fulfil an incentive objective
as well. Water prices which represent full costs (economic and environmental costs) provide
price signals to users resulting in a more efficient water use and generate the means for
ensuring a sustainable water infrastructure (Huijm, n.y.)
3.1.3 Sewerage Charges (Indirect Emissions)
Sewerage charges are tariffs paid for the discharge of used water. A sewerage charge is the
amount of money paid for indirect discharges, that is domestic sewage or effluents
discharged into the sewer system (Hansen et al., 2001). Foremost, sewerage charges have
the objective of providing environmental authorities with financial resources for water
management activities (financial function). Furthermore, these charges may fulfil an incentive
function and are in accordance with the polluter-pays principle by internalizing treatment
costs into the decision process of users through adequate price signals (Kraemer and
Piotrowski, 1995).
3.1.4 Effluent Charges
Dischargers pay effluent charges for the direct discharge of effluents into natural waters.
Usually, the charge is paid to a public or para-statal authority (Hansen et al., 2001). Payment
is based on the measurements or estimates of the quantity and quality of a pollutant
discharged to a natural water body (not a sewer). Pollution charges are an important step
towards the realization of the polluter-pays principle even if their calculation is not based on
estimates of damage costs. By levying a charge on pollution, a clear signal is given that
society is no longer willing to bear the costs of pollution and that at least part of the costs of
the damage caused has to be recovered directly from polluters (Roth, 2001). Pollution
charges may set incentives in terms of pollution abatement promotion. In cases where the
revenue generated by the charge is earmarked for measures to improve water quality, a
pollution charge additionally fulfils a financial function for the improvement of water quality.
Designing optimal pollution charges that minimize the total cost of pollution (damage costs
plus control costs) is a difficult task, as it requires the existence of a reasonable database
and information on pollution damages. The exact calculation of charges requires information
about the exact quantity and quality of the discharged waste water (Kraemer, 1995b).
3.1.5 Subsidies
Subsidies in general include “any measure that keeps prices for consumers below market
levels, or for producers above market levels”. However, given the wide range of possible
support measures, a clear-cut definition of subsidies is difficult to establish. The OECD
(1996) defines environmentally adverse subsidies as “government interventions through
direct and indirect payments, price regulations and protective measures to support actions
that favor environmentally-unfriendly choices over environmentally-friendly ones”. This
definition includes direct subsidies in the form of direct payments by the government to
certain users, and indirect subsidies. Even in the absence of “explicit monetary transfers” one
9can speak of (indirect) water subsidies if the system of water prices in place does not
adequately reflect all costs involved in producing that service. Thus the effective
implementation of the principle of “full cost recovery” in the formation of water prices in turn
would eliminate water subsidies (Kraemer and Buck, 1997). This conceptual perspective
highlights the close relationship between water subsidies and water pricing practices. Further
indirect subsidy schemes include tax concessions or allowances, guaranteed minimum
prices, preferential procurement policies and cross-subsidization.
Generally, subsidies can have two main objectives: either they are instituted to compensate
users for a cost they incur in response to a required action or a prohibition, or subsidies are
constructed so as to set the necessary incentives for achieving a certain desired, but not
required, action.
Subsidies can be of a fiscal nature and paid out of public funds or can take the form of para-
fiscal cross-subsidies through redistribution between urban areas. From an environmental
perspective, a subsidy consists of the value of uncompensated environmental damage
arising from any flow of goods or services (Barg, 1996). As environmental damage is usually
not included in water prices, subsidies de facto often exist.
Subsidies are a type of economic instrument that may lead to inefficient situations (OECD,
1996). However, they can create the necessary incentives for stimulating a change in user
behavior towards environmentally friendly conduct or induce investment in environmentally
friendly production techniques, thereby mitigating or eliminating negative effects. In some
cases, like flood alleviation for example, subsidies may provide a relatively cheap option for
governments, especially considering the reduction in losses that may be achieved through
adequate flood proofing (Otter and van der Veen, 1999). There is, however, a danger that
over the longer term, resources may be channeled to problems that are no longer high
priority.
When the government grants payments in return for an environmental benefit, subsidies are
a form of internalization of external benefits.
3.1.6 Liability for Damage to Water
With the strengthening of regulatory instruments for environmental damage reduction by
individuals and firms and the growing number of emitters to which these apply, problems of
control by environmental inspections become obvious. Therefore, governments are aware of
the need for alternative instruments, one of which is liability for environmental damage
(Bongaerts & Kraemer, 1989), including damage to water.
Environmental liability systems intend to internalize and recover the costs of environmental
damage through legal action and to make polluters pay for the damage their pollution
causes. To that extent environmental liability laws are a fundamental expression of the
polluter-pays principle. The intention of environmental liability laws can be twofold: first of all
they aim at inducing polluters to make more careful decisions about the release of pollution
according to the precautionary principle and second at ensuring the compensation of victims
of pollution. While liability systems assess and recover damages ex post, they can
nevertheless provide incentives to prevent pollution, as long as the expected damage
payments exceed the benefits from non-compliance.
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For liability to be effective, there needs to be one or more identifiable actors (polluters); the
damage needs to be concrete and quantifiable; and a causal link needs to be established
between the damage and the identified polluter (European Commission, 2000c). Thus,
liability is not a suitable instrument for dealing with pollution of a widespread, diffuse
character where it is impossible to link the negative environmental effects with the activities
of certain individual actors.
The instrument of environmental liability conveys several advantages 1:
- Liability rules control pollution through the decentralized decisions of polluters to act in
their own interest. Polluters will control pollution up to the point where the marginal
pollution damage equals the marginal cost of control, thereby minimizing their total costs
for compensating victims and controlling pollution;
- The provision that polluters must pay for the damage they cause provides great
incentives to avoid environmental damage. The higher the anticipated payment in case of
a damage, the higher the incentive for taking preventive measures (precautionary
principle);
- Environmental liability laws constitute a significant step towards the application of the
polluter-pays-principle;
- Environmental liability will also be reflected in prices and is thus an important contribution
towards realizing the principle of “ecologically honest prices”.
3.2 Tradable Permits for Water Management
If disagreement exists over the allocation of water from shared resources among segments
of the population, a potential instrument is the creation of tradable rights to use or pollute
water and the creation of efficient markets on which the rights can be traded. The rationale
behind water allocation through tradable rights is that in a perfectly competitive market,
permits will flow towards their highest value use (Tietenberg, 2000). Permit holders that gain
a lower benefit from using their permits (for example due to higher costs) would have an
incentive to trade them to someone who would value them more. A sale will result in a
situation of mutual benefit: the benefit the permit holder reaps from selling his permit will
exceed the benefit he derives from using it, while the buyer gets more value out of the permit
than he has to pay for it.
Several prerequisites must be fulfilled for the successful implementation of a tradable permit
system. First of all, property rights must be well defined and specified in the unit of measure-
ment (Kraemer et al., 2002). As a second point, water rights must be enforceable to secure
the net benefits flowing from the use of the water rights for the rights holder. In the ideal
case, transferable water rights should be separate from land use in order to create exposure
to the opportunity to realize higher valued alternatives (Pigram, 1993). Finally, an efficient
administrative system must be in place to ensure that the market works appropriately
(Armitage et al., 1999).
Situations in which the conditions may not be adequately met include the possibility for
market power, the presence of high transaction costs and insufficient monitoring and enfor-
                                                
1 Source: http://www.eeb.org.
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cement (Tietenberg, 2000). However, even in the presence of these imperfections, tradable
permit programs can be designed to mitigate their adverse consequences.
When discussing tradable permits systems relating to water, three fundamentally different
fields of application can be discussed which are presented below.
3.2.1 Tradable water abstraction rights
Tradable water abstraction rights are used for quantitative water resource management.
These water rights can be permanent and unlimited (property rights to the water resource) or
temporary and limited (transferable rights to use water without right of abuse). In relation to
tradable water rights, distinctions can be made regarding the “intensity” of trading, which can
be permanent or temporary (seasonal) or even one-off. One of the main objectives when
introducing tradable permits to use water is often to provide an instrument for the
re-allocation of water rights so they can be put to more (economically) beneficial use.
(Kraemer and Banholzer, 1999).
Even though the approach of tradable permits appears to be conceptually sound and should
be attractive for efficiency reasons, only the Commonwealth of Australia, the US, and Chile
have accumulated much experience with tradable water abstraction permits. Some
experience also exists in Spain and Mexico. Australia and the US are both federations where
examples of tradable water permits are found in more than one state. There have been
different patterns of diffusion in the use of tradable permits in both cases, and the experience
is not at all the same. Nevertheless, the hypothesis can be established that federal structures
facilitate innovation in the use of policy instruments because they provide freedom for
regional (state) authorities to experiment, and to create a framework which facilitates “policy
learning” on the basis of these experiments (Kraemer and Banholzer, 1999). In Chile, there
are water markets, largely linked to the agricultural sector, since the Chilean government
enacted the 1981 Water Code. The latter privatized water rights, promoted free market
forces, and sharply reduced government regulatory powers in water management (Bauer,
2003). In Mexico, bulk trades of water for irrigation purposes between Water User
Associations started after the 1992 Mexican National Water Law came into practice
(Kloezen, 1998). Finally, in Spain, local historically grown water markets have existed for a
long time (e.g. in Valencia, mostly for groundwater) (Garrido, 1998). A new water law came
into force in 1999 aiming to incorporate market systems in water management.
So far, the most “lively” trading appears to take place within the agricultural sector, with
transfers from agriculture to other sectors (hydropower or municipal use) being relatively
rare. Nevertheless, such inter-sectoral transfers are perhaps the most significant in economic
terms as they can be expected to provide important added value.
Reviewing recent developments in existing and new water trading schemes, Kraemer et al.
(2002) noted a growing concern about the environmental consequences of water trading,
primarily in Australia and the United States. Concerns mainly relate to inadequate in stream
flows (leading to endangerment of wildlife habitats, certain fish species etc.).
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3.2.2 Tradable permits to water-based resources
Tradable permits can be applied to the use or consumption of water-borne resources, such
as fish or the potential energy of water at height or the kinetic energy of water flowing. There
are several interesting case studies on this field of application of tradable permits. The case
of the Scottish salmon fisheries (see Box) shows that trading may work, as long as there are
no significant externalities (i.e. impacts on, or from, other water uses or functions). However,
the conflict between fishing as a recreational activity (rather than to secure the nutritional
base of the anglers) and conservation requirements is also highlighted (Kraemer and
Banholzer, 1999).
 
 Freshwater Fisheries: Fishing Rights in Scotland
 In Scotland, responsibility for protecting and developing inland salmon fisheries rests with
District Salmon Fishery Boards. Unlike in England and Wales, individual rod licenses (fishing
licenses) are not issued. Instead, salmon fisheries are privately-owned and operated by the
owner or tenant, within a legislative framework set by central Government. Although salmon
does not “belong” to anyone, there is no public right to fish for salmon. The right to fish
belongs to the person who owns the exclusive rights at any one site (fisheries). In most of
Scotland, such rights are owned independently of the land itself (Scottish Office, 1997).2
 The Crown Estate still owns many fisheries and leases them to fishermen on standard five-
year leases. Elsewhere, rights may be held by individuals, public companies, businesses, or
fishing clubs. Fishery owners in any District may set up a District Salmon Fishery Board. The
owners can rent their fishing rights to others, and where they do so, it is usually on a daily or
weekly basis. Time-sharing has also become increasingly popular in the last 10 years, so
that individuals can get a lease to fish for specific period of the year.
 The majority of salmon anglers pay to rent a fishery for a specific period of time. The rental
price depends on the prospects of catching fish, and is often based on the five-year average
catch. On the major Scottish salmon rivers (i.e. where the great majority of fish are caught),
prices for purchasing beats currently range from £6 000-8 000 per fish, based on the average
catch per year for that beat. The fact that individuals own the exclusive right to fish at a site
(e.g. river or loch) is now considered to be one of the main obstacles to the designation of
freshwater habitat protection areas in Scotland.
Source: Kraemer and Banholzer, 1999
3.2.3 Tradable water pollution rights
Tradable discharge permits, or tradable water pollution rights, are used for the protection and
management of (surface) water quality. Such pollution rights can relate to point or to non-
point sources, and trades can even be arranged among different kinds of sources. Under this
approach, a responsible authority sets maximum limits on the total allowable emissions of a
pollutant. It then allocates this total amount among the sources of the pollutant by issuing
permits that authorize industrial plants or other sources to emit a stipulated amount of
                                                
2 
Information on Scottish salmon fishing was provided by Clare Coffey, Institute for European Environmental Policy, London.
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pollutant over a specified period of time. After their initial distribution, permits can be bought
and sold. The trades can be external (between different enterprises) or internal (between
different plants within the same organizations) (WHO/UNEP, 1997).
In contrast to trading water abstraction rights, which can be expressed rather simply in
volumetric terms, trading in permits to pollute water has to cope with a much higher degree
of complexity. Water can be polluted by a number of substances (or classes of substances),
which have very distinct effects on water-based ecosystems. The presence of two or more
pollutants at the same time can lead to synergies, both positive and negative. Furthermore,
most sources of pollution contribute more than one substance that is dangerous to the water
environment. In relation to water pollution much more than with water abstraction, it is the
precise location of a discharge that determines the environmental consequences (Kraemer
and Banholzer, 1999).
In general, experience to date with permits to pollute water resources is limited, but it
appears that trading can be part of the answer to achieve better water quality (Faerth, 2000).
Mainly US (since the 1980s) and Australia, both federations, have accumulated experience
with tradable water pollution rights. The European Union (EU), which in some ways
resembles a federation, provides another example. The EU does on occasion make use of
“bubbles”3, for instance in the implementation of the Montreal Protocol on substances that
deplete the ozone layer. It has also adopted a provision allowing for water pollution trading in
the context of its Urban Waste Water Treatment Directive, but this has not yet been applied
anywhere (see Box) (Kraemer and Banholzer, 1999).
European Union: Urban Waste Water Treatment Directive
 The European Union can adopt Directives that are legally binding on its Member
States. Among its legislation concerning water resource protection and management, the
Urban Waste Water Treatment Directive (91/271/EEC) has a reputation for being the most
expensive item of European legislation in the environmental field. Its purpose is to stimulate
Member States to invest in the collection and treatment of urban wastewater. Different
requirements and deadlines apply to “sensitive”, “normal”, and “non-sensitive” areas,
meaning water bodies and their catchment areas. The Directive leaves the Member States
much freedom in its implementation, such as a choice between limit values for treatment
plant effluent and percentage reduction goals or a choice between reducing phosphorus (P)
or nitrogen (N).
 In sensitive areas (i.e. areas tending towards eutrophication, because of excessive
levels of P and N), adequate collection and “more stringent than secondary” (i.e. tertiary)
treatment systems were to be installed by 31 December 1998 for all discharges from
agglomerations of more than 10 000 population equivalents. Discharges from such systems
                                                
3 In the concept of “bubbles”, requirements of pollution abatement are applied to the sources of an industrial
facility owned by the same firm, by taking all these sources as a whole (OECD, 2001). However, the bubble
can also encompass polluting sources belonging to several firms. An imaginary bubble is placed over a set of
sources and only the total quantity of pollutants emitted under the bubble is taken into consideration. Thus,
polluters are free, within certain limits, to offset excess emissions from one source by a reduction made on
another source, as long as overall quantity is not exceeded.
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must meet emission limit values for either P or N. The limit values for P are 2 mg/l in
agglomerations of between 10 000 and 100 000 population equivalents and 1 mg/l in larger
agglomerations (measured as P). The limit values for N are 15 mg/l for agglomerations of
between 10 000 and 100 000 population equivalents and 10 mg/l in larger agglomerations
(measured as N). Alternatively to the use of limit values, P may be reduced by 80 per cent or
N by 70-80 per cent.
 The Directive makes provisions for trades in P and N emissions. Article 5(4) of the
Directive states that the above requirements need not apply in sensitive areas, where it can
be shown that the minimum percentage of reduction of the overall load entering all urban
waste water treatments plants in that area is at least 75 per cent for total P, and at least
75 per cent for total N. With the wording “overall load entering all urban waste water
treatments plants”, this Article clearly opens the possibility for emissions trading within an
“emissions bubble” thus described. However, it also establishes restrictions. Notably: (i) the
“bubble area” must be a “sensitive area” within the definitions of the Directive; (ii) the
reduction would need be attained over all urban waste water treatment plants and not only
the larger installations; and (iii) the reduction probably must be attained for both P and N
simultaneously. The weight of these restrictions is not clear, but is unlikely to present serious
obstacles to any pragmatic implementation of an emissions trading regime.
None of the EC Member States so far appear to have taken advantage of the
possibility of establishing emissions trading in “sensitive area” bubbles, and the possibility
appears to not even have been discussed among the national experts in the Technical
Committee established under the Directive. As an indication of some interest, the
Netherlands have mentioned the possibility in their first implementation report to the
European Commission, and have asked a national committee to develop scenarios. The
evident lack of general interest so far may be regrettable, since a potentially important source
of economies in pollution abatement costs remains untapped, in spite of the wide-spread
concerns about the financial implications of the Directive.
Source: Kraemer and Banholzer, 1999
4 TRADABLE WATER POLLUTION RIGHTS: THE INTERNATIONAL EXPERIENCE
As illustrated in the previous section, tradable water pollution rights, which are the focus of
this paper, are one type of market-based instrument used for water pollution control. In this
section, examples of international experience with water pollution trading are reviewed on the
basis of selected case studies.
Additionally to the description of tradable water pollution rights given in the previous section,
water pollution rights can be further differentiated in relation to the polluting substance (or
class of substances) in question. Water pollution permits can contain long lists of substances
and parameters that have to be observed. It is not surprising; therefore, that there are no
examples of trading systems in water pollution as such, but only in relation to individual
substances or parameters (salt, organic oxygen-depleting substances, and nutrients)
Accordingly, the practical examples in this section are presented according to different
individual substances or parameters (salinity trading, organic pollution rights trading and
nutrient pollution rights trading).
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The practical examples presented come from the US and Australia which have been the
main regions with extensive application of this type of economic instrument for water
pollution control. The description of the cases is based on two previous reviews on water-
based tradable permits by Kraemer and Banholzer (1999) as well as Kraemer et al. (2002).
Where information was available, these examples have been updated with recent
developments in the context of this paper.
4.1 Salinity Trading
Salt pollution in freshwater systems affects the suitability of water for many purposes, such
as irrigation or drinking water supply. It can also have significant environmental effects on
relatively sensitive ecosystems that rely on brackish water, such as in estuaries. The
concentration of salt ions is relatively easy to assess by measuring the electrical conductivity
of water. Conductivity is not a specific indicator of toxicity, nor is it a suitable proxy for
dangerous substances. It is however, a useful parameter when measuring the concentration
of salts, the nature and origins of which are well understood.
Salt pollution usually originates in the mining industry (salt mines, but also mine water from
coal mines, for instance) or the energy sector, where cooling by water evaporation leaves
saline residues. Salt pollution can also occur naturally as a result of erosion or natural
dissolution of salt deposits. Where salt concentrations (rather than loads) trigger problems,
dilution by fresh water can provide a (temporary) solution.
Although salt pollution rarely reaches levels where corrective action has to be taken, the
examples of where it does can be instructive. Chloride pollution of the international river
Rhine, for instance, provided the stimulus for developing the multilateral system of the
riparian states for managing economic and environmental aspects of the river.
The most prominent examples of salinity trading come from Australia, with the inter-state
trading case in the Murray-Darling Basin, and the more market-oriented approach in the
Hunter River in the State of New South Wales. In both cases, the concern is for reducing and
“managing” salt pollution to reduce harm.
4.1.1 Inter-State Salinity Trading Case: Murray-Darling Basin (Australia)
Interstate salinity trading came into force in 1992 as part of the Murray-Darling Basin Salinity
and Drainage Strategy, administered by the Murray-Darling Basin Commission, on behalf of
the States of New South Wales, Victoria and South Australia. The interstate salinity trading is
based on a system of salt credits and debits. The salt pollution rights are not freely traded by
industries or individuals, but are exchanged between the governments of the participating
states. Credits are earned by investing in capital works to manage salt entering the river.
Although credits are tradable between the States, they are generally applied within each
State to offset debits from drainage entering the river system (James, 1997).
The Salinity and Drainage Strategy has been successful in achieving a net reduction of 57
EC (Electrical Conductivity) units in the lower river Murray. However, investigations
throughout the 1990s showed that increasing salinity in the Basin is threatening the further
success of the Strategy. Therefore, a new Basin Salinity Management Strategy 2001-2015
has been developed to ensure that further activities in the Murray-Darling Basin against
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salinity are successful. The new Strategy establishes a basin-wide target, with Queensland
also participating, for river salinity at a level of less than 800 EC units for 95% of the time
over 15 years at Morgan, South Australia (downstream State). The end-of-valley target is in
effect a ‘cap’ on salinity pollution. The effective date for the new arrangements was 1
January 2000 (Murray Darling Basin Ministerial Council, 2000).
The system of salinity credits continues, but now operates basin-wide. Each government will
contribute to joint or individual works that will reduce the salinity of the shared rivers, thus
earning salinity credits. Any work within a State that further reduces salinity in the shared
rivers will attract additional credits for that State. All States will incur debits based on the
basis of the estimated shortfall in protecting shared rivers and for specific actions such as
drainage that increase salinity in the shared rivers. The Murray Darling Basin Commission
maintains a register of works undertaken and the salinity credit and debit impacts. The
salinity impact of any proposed irrigation scheme must offset by acquitting credits in the
register. A review of the salinity debit and credit accounting system will be undertaken after
2015 (Murray Darling Basin Ministerial Council, 2000).
4.1.2 Salt Pollution Trading Case: Hunter River (Australia)
The Hunter River Salinity Trading Scheme is Australia's first active emissions trading
scheme, put in operation as a pilot in 1995 by the Environmental Protection Agency of New
South Wales (NSW EPA), and has proved very successful (NSW EPA, 2001a). It was
established to resolve a longstanding and frequently acrimonious dispute over the impacts of
saline discharges to the Hunter River.
In the context of the scheme, each discharger is allowed to discharge a specified percentage
of the total allowable salt load, which is calculated in relation to conductivity levels. The
scheme was developed from the existing salt licensing regime and was initially limited to coal
mines and the power generation industry of Pacific Power. Initial experience showed that
conductivity levels remained within the target limits, with only a few trades occurring. Low
trading levels were due to uncertainty about long-term needs, arrangements for longer-term
allocations (James, 1997) and inexperience with the scheme (NSW EPA, 2001b). It is
possible that the purely paper-based trading mechanism had inhibited the potential volume of
trades. The NSW EPA then developed a 24-hour on-line credit exchange, to make trading for
license holders faster and easier (NSW EPA, 2001b).
In general, the salinity target (900 EC unit level at Singleton monitoring point and 600 EC
units at Denman) has not been exceeded as a result of participant's discharges since the
scheme has been in operation. There has been some a few occasions where the target has
been exceeded, primarily caused  by saline diffuse run-off (NSW EPS, 2001a). Notably, the
number of occasions in which the target has been exceeded, decreased from 33% before the
introduction of the scheme to 4% currently (NSW EPA, 2001b). The trading scheme operates
during high flows. No discharge is allowed during low flows and unlimited discharges are
allowed during flood flows. The Department of Land and Water Conservation estimates the
total allowable salt discharge at high flows so that the river is below the salinity target.
Trading has allowed major industries such as coal mining and power generation, to
discharge saline water on a managed basis. It has also reduced significant costs of water
storage or treatment that would otherwise have been incurred by those industries under the
17
previous discharge management system, which included a traditional licensing strategy
requiring industries to minimize discharges and discharge a small volume of saline water to
the river at all times. A major advantage of the scheme is an extensive monitoring network,
which monitors each authorized point of discharge (NSW EPA, 2001b).
In 1999 and 2000, the number of trades increased, with 31 trades occurring in 2000 (NSW
EPA, 2001b). Due to the success of the scheme during its pilot phase, the EPA established
the scheme through a new specific legislation. The Protection of the Environment Operations
(Hunter River Salinity Trading Scheme) Regulation 2002 permanently implements the
existing pilot trading and places it into a firm legislative framework (NSW EPA, 2003). The
Protection of the Environment Operations (Hunter River Salinity Trading Scheme) Regulation
2002 brought in the following main elements:
· The creation (reissue) of 1000 tradable salinity credits of different life spans (2 to 10
years), which were allocated without charge to license holders.
· The expiry of 20% of the credits every 2 years, and the reallocation of those credits by
public auction, with each credit then valid for 10 years. Therefore, the mechanism for
allocation, holding and trading credits has been altered, moving from administrative
allocation of credits to initial allocation based on current holdings (grandfathering)
followed by 2-yearly credit auctions. Auctions will ensure new industries can readily enter
the scheme and access credits.
· The creation of new administrative roles: the Services Coordinator who is responsible for
river monitoring, modeling and River Register services, the EPA which provides licensing,
regulation, online credit register and exchange, the Hunter River Valley Salinity Trading
Scheme Operations Committee which is a stakeholder committee and deals with issues
relating to the day-to-day operation of the scheme (NSW EPA, 2003).
The success of the scheme, which has been designed to suit the unique characteristics of
the Hunter River catchment, is due to a number of factors. First, having a good
understanding of the river on the basis of long-term data collection and modeling of the
river’s behavior was vital to designing an effective scheme. Secondly, the scheme was a
result of extensive consultation with the community and was thoroughly tested in 7-year pilot
scheme (1995-2002) before being formally established through legislation. The fact that the
scheme is underpinned by legislation is also important in itself; The EPA believed significant
benefits would occur from the new regulation such as increased certainty that the scheme
will continue to function, which provides investors with a longer planning horizon (NSW EPA,
2001b). Finally, the scheme is supported by real time data and trading with continuous
measurements of river flow and salinity, modeling expertise as well as the online daily River
Register and Credit Trading (NSW EPA, 2003).
4.2 Trading of Organic Pollution Rights
A more challenging aspect of trading in water pollution permits is presented by organic
pollution. Such pollution consists of a multitude of different substances containing carbon,
any one of which may be present at concentrations below critical levels. Such substances
can originate from human wastes (e.g. sewage), but also in industrial effluent (e.g. food and
beverage industries), as well as from rainwater run-off. Organic pollution can be controlled
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(but not fully eliminated) by treatment, and the ability to release such pollution into recipient
water bodies typically has a significant impact on the cost of treatment.
(Almost) all organic pollution is naturally degraded or “metabolized” by biological mecha-
nisms in natural water systems, consuming oxygen in the process. When oxygen is con-
sumed, the level of oxygen dissolved in the water decreases. In extreme cases, especially
during periods of low flow or in warm water, the water can be deprived of oxygen to the point
that fish and other life in rivers and lakes die. This is not a slow process but can often ”hit” a
river as a consequence of a single pollution incident, such as storm water over-flow being
discharged. It is therefore vital to control overall pollution with oxygen-consuming sub-
stances, and to ensure sufficient levels of dissolved oxygen in waters.
The example presented below refers to the Fox River in the US.
4.2.1 Organic Point Source Trading Case: Fox River, Wisconsin (USA)
In the US, the State of Wisconsin established the legislative basis for an operational
water-pollution permit market. The Wisconsin Department of Natural Resources approved
the trading of rights to discharge into the Fox River as early as 1981. Point sources of water
pollution can trade rights to discharge wastes that increase biological oxygen demand
(BOD). The Wisconsin programme was aimed at providing flexibility for point sources, which
are in this case paper mills and municipal wastewater treatment plants, in meeting State
water quality standards. Sources that reduce discharges containing BOD below permitted
amounts are allowed to sell the excess reductions to other sources. The pulp and paper mill
effluent guidelines suggested that substantial costs would be incurred to meet the stringent
limits required by the water quality standards because of the large numbers of dischargers
concentrated in a few miles of the State streams. Although early studies indicated several
potentially profitable trades involving large cost savings (in the order of US$ 7 million), to
date only two trades have occurred (Nishizawa, 2003). In fact, the effluent guidelines now
appear to have far overstated the needed expenditures. Costs in addition to those needed to
meet the national point source requirements were not incurred (Carlin, 1992; see also O’Neil,
1983; O'Neil et al., 1983).
Under this system, permission to trade will only be granted if the discharger meets certain
preconditions:
· the plant acquiring the rights must be new or growing, or at least unable to meet the
discharge limit despite working efficiently (this seemingly prohibits trades that merely
reduce treatment costs or speculative acquisitions);
· every firm has to prove the increase in water pollution is necessary;
· traded rights must have a life of at least one year, but no longer than the seller’s
discharge permit expiration date.
In a 1992 EPA Report, Carlin judged the trading to have been disappointing (Carlin, 1992,
page 6-29). He stated three reasons for the limited activity:
· Dischargers developed a variety of compliance alternatives not contemplated when the
regulations were drafted.
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· There ... remained questions about the vulnerability of the programme to legal challenge,
since the Clean Water Act does not explicitly authorize trading (implying uncertainty
about the legal viability of the rights being traded).
· The State imposed severe restrictions on the ability of sources to trade (constrained
scope for trading).
The literature suggests that numerous administrative requirements have also added to the
cost of trading and lowered the incentive for facilities to participate (WHO/UNEP, 1997).
David (2003) mentions that along the Fox River there are only five pulp and paper mills and
two municipalities on each of the three segments, which are too few for a reliable market to
exist. Moreover, potential gains from trade were not substantial making trade unattractive to
operators.
4.3 Trading of Nutrient Pollution Rights
The last category of water pollution trading refers to nutrients. Nutrients (i.e. nitrogen and
phosphorous) are not in themselves dangerous to water or water-based ecosystems. In fact,
they are necessary components of plant life. That is why they are applied as fertilizers to
enhance plant growth. They also appear in domestic sewage in significant concentrations
and loads. However, in water bodies, they stimulate plant (algal) growth, which consumes
oxygen and can thus lead to fish kills.
In many respects, the logic of nutrients trading follows that of trading in organic pollution
permits. However, since agriculture is an important source of the former, there is scope here
for trades between point and non-point (or diffuse) sources. In the following paragraphs, one
example is presented relating to the Hawkesbury-Nepean River in New South Wales
(Australia). This example is one where “trades” (in the form of intra-firm allocations) affect
point sources only. The results for the first three years of the operation of the programme
were rather positive (NSW EPA, 2001c).
Further examples are presented from the US including the Tar-Pamlico Basin in North
Carolina (case of point-point source trading also allowing for point-non-point trade), the case
of Lake Dillon and the case of the Cherry Creek Basin in Colorado (both involving point-non-
point source trading). The Chesapeake Bay nutrient-trading programme is also described as
part of a number of other on going and under development effluent trading projects of the US
EPA and several States.
Actually, despite the considerable effort by the US EPA and individual states to implement
the concept, the trading of emissions to water has yet to live up to its full promise (NCEE,
2001). EPA, in particular, has been on the forefront of the effluent trading concept and it
composed a set of guidelines for developing trading programmes in 1996 (EPA, 1996a). New
efforts by the EPA to implement its so far little-known provision for Total Maximum Daily
Loads (TMDLs)4 in areas with impaired water quality are expected to vastly increase the use
                                                
4 A Total Maximum Daily Load (TDML) should be developed by States and is the process under the Clean
Water Act that establishes the maximum pollutant load a water body can receive without violating water
quality standards. A TMDL describes how much pollution can be discharged into a water body and who is
allowed to discharge it. It includes allocations of pollutant loads among sources: wasteload allocations for
point sources, load allocations for non-point sources, background loadings from natural sources, and margins
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of effluent trading (NCEE, 2001), so as to lower compliance costs of affected sources.
Parties to the water trading negotiate within the overall loading capacity determined under
the TMDL. Trades can occur within TMDLs through development of final allocations among
participating sources or, if a TMDL is already in place, by revisions of allocations to reflect
proposed changes in individual load reduction responsibilities by trading (EPA, 1996). To
encourage experimentation with trading schemes, the EPA issued a water quality trading
policy in 2003 (EPA, 2003). The policy supports trading of nutrients and sediment load
reductions. It is not a regulatory rule but sets objectives and guidelines for scheme design.
4.3.1 Hawkesbury-Nepean River (Australia)
Three sewage treatment plants of Sydney Water Corporation (SWC) in the South Creek area
of the Hawkesbury-Nepean River are the participants of a ”bubble”-licensing scheme with the
aim of obtaining improved environmental outcomes at lower cost. The owners of the
individual sources within the bubble are permitted to adjust their discharges by trading parts
of their nutrient discharge allocations, provided the aggregate limit is not exceeded. The
”bubble”-licensing scheme commenced in 1996 developed by the EPA of New South Wales
and set nutrient reduction targets until 2004 for both phosphorus (83%) and nitrogen (50%)
(James, 1997). It is basically a small self-contained emissions trading scheme and it
functions within a strong regulatory framework.
The NSW EPA conducted a review of the Scheme’s first three years of operation (NSW EPA,
2001c). It concluded that Sydney Water Corporation has complied with the “bubble” load
limits, while significant reductions in nutrient discharges have been achieved. However, it is
yet early to conclude on the environmental response to the discharge reductions, based on
the available monitoring data.  Both discharge monitoring of the individual treatment plants
as well as ambient monitoring is carried out by SWC to measure the impact of nutrients from
South Creek on the main reach of the river. Additionally, new scientific information on the
impact of nutrients suggests that there may be a need for a further nitrogen reduction.
The possibility of including non-point sources in the “bubble” is increasingly discussed and
should be further explored (NSW EPA, 2001c). The “bubble” - licensing scheme could
provide a strong basis for extending trading to incorporate diffuse sources, if further work
could provide a basis to quantify the differing impacts of point versus non-point discharges.
Point and non-point sources are not considered currently directly comparable, due to the
dependence of non-point discharges on weather events. However, including non-point
sources in the “bubble” could be particularly worthwhile if the costs of reducing diffuse
discharges were significantly lower than for point sources, after taking into account
appropriate trading ratios to reflect their lesser impact. Additionally, any effort to extend the
bubble scheme to diffuse sources must recognize the complex array of other initiatives,
which aim to address water quality problems from diffuse sources. Such initiatives are storm
water management and several integrated catchment management processes (NSW EPA,
2001c).
Overall, the “bubble”–licensing scheme is considered successful, since it allows flexibility in
capital infrastructure planning by allowing investment in one or two plants opposed to all
                                                                                                                                                        
of safety to ensure achievement of water quality goals (EPA, 1996). States establish TMDLs for every
location that will not meet water quality standards given the current regulatory framework.
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three, as would occur under uniform concentration limits. Long–term cost savings are
estimated to be A$45.6 million (or 37%) compared to requiring plants to meet uniform
reduction individually (NSW EPA, 2001c).
4.3.2 Tar-Pamlico River, North Carolina (USA)
The Tar Pamlico Basin was designated "nutrient sensitive water" and was given a basin-wide
"bubble" (annual, collective nutrient loading cap for 14 point source dischargers of the Tar-
Pamlico Basin Association) for nutrient pollution in 1989 (Anderson and Snyder, 1997). The
Tar-Pamlico Basin Association administers the scheme and facilitates trade of “shares” to the
“bubble” emission limit among member pollution dischargers (Association members), and
with non-member farmers who reduce field run-off and collectively reduce the discharge of
phosphorous and nitrogen to the Pamlico estuary. Point sources accounted for only 15 per
cent of the total nutrient load in the watershed, with the majority coming from agricultural and
other non-point sources. Any member of the Association can reduce nutrients internally,
trade within the group, or pay fees to a fund that goes toward non-point source reductions
(non-point source (NPS) fund). The funds generated from effluent charges are then used to
reduce nutrient loads from non-point sources. Farmers in the region are paid to adopt
management practices that reduce nutrient runoff. The transactions among these point and
non-point source polluters represent a distinguishing feature of the Association’s procedures
(Riggs and Yandle, 1997).
Under Phase I (1991-1994), municipal sources were allowed to offset excess discharges with
nutrient reduction credits obtained through contributions to the NPS fund. Phase I nutrient
reductions were greater than the desired goal, due to the low-cost improvements at the
municipal wastewater treatment facilities. It is worth noting that the estimated cost would be
US$7 million to achieve the same level of wastewater treatment plant nutrient reductions that
can be achieved with US$1 million by investing in non-point source pollution control (Great
Lakes Trading Network, 2001).
Phase II of the programme runs until December 2004, and foresees a 30% reduction for
nutrients. A main component of Phase II is wetland restoration and identification of areas of
major non-point pollution in order to set action priorities. Two signatories to Phase I of the
programme, the Environmental Defense Fund and the Pamlico-Tar River Foundation, did not
endorse Phase II, because they were concerned about the programme’s ability to address
non-point pollution sources and the nutrient cap for point sources (EPA, 1996b).
Under the Tar Pamlico Basin Nutrient Trading Programme, point source/point source trading
has occurred under Phase I and continues under Phase II, allowing point sources to optimize
the cost of achieving the nutrient cap established for the Association. To date, point/non-
point source trading has also occurred in excess of US$750,000 (Great Lakes Trading
Network, 2001).
Although an in-depth evaluation of the Tar-Pamlico trading scheme is so far missing in the
literature, it is certainly one of the most frequently heard about programmes in the US and is
considered in overall a quite successful one. Nevertheless, discussions on Phase II have
indicated potential problems of trading to deal with non-point pollution sources. It may be
worth evaluating more into depth the success of the specific instrument of tradable permits,
by comparing the results of trading with the potential results (and costs) of alternative
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pollution reduction instruments in the Tar Pamlico Basin (Kraemer et al., 2002). According to
Nishizawa (2003), the Tar-Pamlico case has also shown that if a trading programme
effectively incorporates existing institutions, such as soil conservation districts and
agricultural cost-sharing programmes, transaction and administrative costs can be
significantly lowered.
4.3.3 Lake Dillon, Colorado (USA)
Lake Dillon of Summit County in Colorado, a tourist attraction and a significant source of
water supply for Denver, has been under significant pressure from phosphorus discharges.
Four municipal treatment plants, sixteen small treatment plants, one industrial plant and
numerous non-point sources discharge waste into the reservoir. Runoff from towns and ski
areas is the main non-point source of phosphorus, along with selected inadequately
managed septic systems (EPA, 1996b). This situation caused a coalition of concerned
stakeholders to form the Phosphorus Club. The Phosphorus Club came up with an
innovative strategy called the Dillon “bubble” also establishing the first trading programme in
the US (Apogee Research, Inc., 1992). After annual discharge rights of phosphorus load
were allocated for every point discharger, trade between point and non-point sources of
phosphorus around Lake Dillon has been allowed since 1984. Due to the uncertainty related
to the control of non-point sources credits for non-point pollutant reductions were only traded
for point loads at a 2:1 ratio. This means that a point source had to reduce two tons from
non-point sources (that existed before 1984) before it could increase its own discharge by
one ton. Economically, such a trade can still be interesting for the discharger: the marginal
cost for removal of one pound of phosphorus from a wastewater treatment plant is estimated
US$860, while the average cost of non-point source control is US$119 (Carlin, 1992).
Thereby, municipal facilities are allowed to obtain phosphorous reduction credits by funding
controls to reduce phosphorous loadings from existing urban non-point sources.
Until 1988, the basin management authority approved no trading, since critical loads were
not exceeded (Carlin, 1992). Until the end of 1996, a few trades had taken place between
point and non-point sources. The Lake Dillon phosphorus-trading programme has refocused
at maintaining equitable non-point-non-point source trading and enforcement. New non-point
sources must offset all of their discharges by using a trading ratio of 1:1 with existing non-
point sources. The co-operative management approach that grew out of developing the
option of the trading programme is considered by a number of stakeholders as the reason
why Lake Dillon has succeeded in maintaining high water quality. When point-non-point
source trading occurs, point source discharge permits include information on the record of
the credit amount, specified construction requirements for non-point source control as well as
monitoring, reporting requirements, and operation of non-point source best management
practices (BMP) (EPA, 1996b). The lake Dillon trading programme is coordinated by the
Summit County Water Quality Committee, which distributes phosphorus credits, identifies
potential BMP projects, ensures monitoring is performed and non-point source pollution
reduction programmes, such as covering of septic tanks, are implemented.
Trading has still been very slow due to limited population growth and a recession in the
region. Moreover, the wastewater treatment plants have found cheaper means of controlling
phosphorus than were previously envisioned. In the future, however, opportunities for further
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control at the treatment plants are thought to be limited, and population growth seems to be
evident, leading to the conclusion that more trading activity is likely (NCEE, 2001).
4.3.4 Cherry Creek, Colorado (USA)
The Cherry Creek reservoir near Denver is an important recreation area and water supply
source. A total phosphorus standard was developed in 1984 for the reservoir, as well as a
Total Maximum Daily Load (TMDL) (EPA, 1996b) to prevent eutrophication and maintain
water quality standards established by the Colorado Water Quality Commission. The Cherry
Creek Trading programme allows certain point source polluters to earn phosphorus reduction
credits through the control of non-point source phosphorus discharges (Carlin, 1992). The
TMDL requires urban non-point sources to reduce phosphorus loads by implementing best
management practices. However, non-point sources, which account for approximately 80%
of the basin's phosphorus load, have to reduce their loading by 50% on their own, and only
reductions beyond these required non-point reductions can qualify for trading (Great Lakes
Trading Network, 2001).
Initially, the Authority has the possibility to engage in two types of trade: trades of
phosphorus reduction credits generated through authority water quality improvement projects
and trades of credits generated through private projects. More specifically, the Authority has
four completed non-point source water quality improvement projects that generate
phosphorus reduction credits under the trading programme. Credits from Authority projects
are placed in a Trade Pool for transfer to individual dischargers. The Authority also reviews
similar privately constructed projects and assigns credits to the private party accordingly. All
credits are quantified through direct water quality monitoring. Dischargers may purchase
credits from the Trade Pool, if they fulfill certain requirements. They should namely
demonstrate the requisite need for the increased phosphorus allocation, their wastewater
treatment facility should operate and continue to operate so as to achieve expected
phosphorus levels, and they should comply with the existent effluent limits. The Authority
itself transfers credits to dischargers from the trade pool on a long-term basis, but does not
convey ownership of credits in such transfers (EPA, 1996b).
Development and credit use are required to be consistent with a basin plan established by
the Cherry Creek Basin Water Quality Authority. The Cherry Creek trading programme is
being revised to reflect baseline allocations under an updated TMDL (Great Lakes Trading
Network, 2001). To date, there has been no need to trade at Cherry Creek since phosphorus
effluent still remains below the allowed limits. When regional economic growth compels
wastewater treatment facilities to achieve greater phosphorus reductions, the credits will be
available (NCEE, 2001).
4.3.5 Chesapeake Bay (USA)
The Chesapeake Bay is the largest estuary complex in North America. In the early 1980's,
research carried out by the US EPA revealed that low dissolved oxygen in the Chesapeake
Bay due to nutrient enrichment was a major problem, and the estuary was in need of a
collaborative restoration effort. Therefore, the US EPA, the States of Maryland, Virginia,
Pennsylvania, the District of Columbia and the Chesapeake Bay Commission signed the
1987 Chesapeake Bay Agreement. According to the Agreement, a 40% reduction of
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nutrients, compared to 1985 levels, in the Bay is necessary to restore its health by the year
2000 (Wiedeman, 2001). New restoration commitments were adopted under the agreement
Chesapeake Bay 2000, which aims to remove the Bay and its tidal waters from the list of
impaired water bodies for nutrients by 2010. This would require nutrient reductions far
beyond the 1987 40% goal. In the meantime, growth in nutrient load may be expected due to
increases in sewage flows and polluted runoff from new development. If these goals are not
achieved by the deadline date, a TDML for the whole watershed (more stringent water quality
management system) will come into effect (Nishizawa, 2003).
Trading to maintain the cap is considered a significant strategy for Chesapeake Bay. Some
of the Bay jurisdictions actually began to explore trading on their own. Virginia’s legislature
enacted the Virginia Water Quality Improvement Act in 1998, which includes a clause
requiring trading to be explored as a means of nutrient management (Wiedeman, 2001).
Other States proceeded to analysis of the trading market (Maryland) as well as consideration
of pilot projects (Pennsylvania) (Nishizawa, 2003).
In 1998, the Chesapeake Bay Programme formed the Nutrient Trading Negotiation Team, to
explore trading in the Chesapeake Bay. The team had to examine the concept of trading in
the Bay and develop nutrient trading guidelines to assist States in voluntarily developing
State-specific nutrient trading programmes. The Negotiation Team focused mainly on the 6
following elements, which are vital to the trading framework: the nutrient reduction goals,
eligibility of credits to trade, trade administration, accountability, indicators for assessment of
the scheme, and stakeholder involvement (Wiedeman, 2001). According to the fundamental
principles on trading that the Team formulated, trading will be allowed only within each major
Bay tributary among all signatory States to the 1987 Bay Agreement, as well as non-
signatory States if they are consistent with the trading guidelines (Nutrient Trading
Negotiation Team, 2001). The nutrient-trading programme should also be consistent with the
Chesapeake Bay Programme’s reduction goals, i.e. 40% reduction. To achieve this, trading
should be allowed only among “like” sources until the 40% cut-back goal is achieved, which
means trading between point and non-point sources is not allowed. However, once the goal
has been reached, point  non-point source trading will be permitted, and can prove useful in
sustaining the target level. The trading programme should set specific nutrient load
allocations for each major Bay tributary, a baseline and a cap, as well as allowances for point
and non-point sources. The final Nutrient Trading Guidelines of 2001 are available for use by
States on a voluntary basis to design their own trading programmes (Wiedeman, 2001). It is
considered that many point sources will be able to generate credits for trade, since there are
347-point source wastewater treatment plants in the Bay watershed. Each trade should result
in net reduction in nutrient loading and also maintain the tributary nutrient cap. No local water
quality impacts are allowed to result from trading. A source may receive credits for reductions
in nutrients, through the operation of a facility or the implementation of a BMP (Nutrient
Trading Negotiation Team, 2001).
As far as administration is concerned, each State should be responsible for programme
oversight and day-to-day management (certification, registration, monitoring, evaluating). A
central State coordinating office should be established in each State to deal with the
administration of trades. Trades should also be governed by a State general regulation under
the State’s water quality law, and public participation prior to the execution of a trade should
be promoted (Nutrient Trading Negotiation Team, 2001).
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The experience from the Chesapeake Bay Programme showed that public involvement and
stakeholder participation are key to reaching overall consensus on trading programmes. In
the context of the Chesapeake Bay Programme, a long negotiation process took place to
develop principles and guidelines for nutrient trading accompanied by a series of public
workshops to explain and discuss the draft principles (Nishizawa, 2003).
5 LESSONS LEARNED ON TRADABLE WATER POLLUTION RIGHTS
This section aims to draw some general lessons learned from the international experience
presented on tradable water pollution rights (for salinity, organic pollution and nutrients).
Overall, as it is obvious from the examples of tradable water pollution rights presented
above, trading has been applied effectively only to pollution covered by a single chemical or
(in the case of electrical conductivity) a single physical parameter. This does not mean that
only pollution by identical substances is traded, as the parameters used often refer to classes
of substances, such as soluble salts or substances oxidized by  by bio-chemical processes.
However, in the case of nutrient pollution single elements or substances are the objects of
trading (e.g. phosphorus loads).
Experience with salinity trading so far has been rather limited with the most prominent
examples existent in Australia. The examples show such trading to be highly intertwined with
traditional environmental management systems and strategies. Good scientific
understanding of the catchments in question in this case has supported the establishment of
trading regimes. Trading is facilitated by the fact that salt pollution can be measured
relatively easily, and on a continuous basis. In effect, monitoring the behavior of the market
participants is relatively cheap. Moreover, the practical examples given may be useful in
designing tradable permit systems for other high profile pollutants, for which continuous
analysis may be possible like in the case of salinity.
Experience with organic pollution trading has so far not been very encouraging as illustrated
by the case study on the Fox River in the US. However, it appears that this is largely due to a
lack of understanding about abatement technologies (and their costs) when the permit
trading system was established (Kraemer and Banholzer, 1999). Nevertheless, tradable
permits for organic pollution could create an incentive for polluters to identify further
possibilities for abatement not apparent to the command-and-control regulators, and
therefore not attainable within the existing regulatory regime (Smith, 1999).
Regarding nutrients trading, the experience has been most successful within the conceptual
framework of a “bubble” over point sources. In such a context and given that nutrient
abatement is largely dependent on up-front investments in treatment systems, trading
becomes a tool for allocating and optimizing investment. The system of tradable nutrient
pollution permits is underpinned by strong (and pre-existing) regulatory regimes, which
provide a framework, including sanctions on individuals for overall failures in pollution
abatement.
In the examples presented in this paper, nutrients are not normally a pollution problem of
short duration or local extent. This is because their levels in effluents and initial receiving
waters have usually already been reduced to levels where no immediate effects occur.
Instead, they often have effects over long distances (such as in estuaries or marine basins
far away from the average point of discharge, e.g. Chesapeake Bay), or they affect the
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long-term quality of water bodies, such as lakes used for drinking water production (e.g. Lake
Dillon). Because of this, nutrients remain a focus of water quality management and may even
become a more interesting field for applying tradable permits in the future.
In the context of nutrients trading, there is also scope for trades between point and non-point
(or diffuse) sources. As obvious from the cases presented, although this type of trades
(point-non-point) needs further investigation, it is increasingly being practised and further
promoted. Environmental protection measures have succeeded in reducing point source
pollution in many countries while non-point pollution is gaining in importance. As a result,
trades between point and non-point pollution now offer themselves as potential policy
measures, especially since reducing non-point pollution is often more cost effective in
meeting quality objectives than additional investment in point-source control (e.g. case of
Tar-Pamlico). However, looking at the relevant experience in the US, the development of
emissions trading for nutrients control has had mixed results partly due to the difficulties in
addressing non-point source pollution. The difficulties in controlling non-point pollution
through trade stem from the need to consider other complexities in the design of a scheme.
Problems arise through the uncertainties in estimating and monitoring non-point source loads
as well as due to lack of direct comparability of point and non-point pollution, since non-point
discharges may depend on weather events, for instance (Kraemer et al., 2002). To address
uncertainty with nutrient reduction from non-point sources, a trading ratio or discount factor is
commonly applied to non-point source reductions, as in the case of the Lake Dillon in
Colorado.
The lessons drawn here are based on the selected examples from the international arena
and they should be considered within the institutional and existing regulatory context of the
countries in question, i.e. US and Australia. Both countries had a functioning regulatory
regime for water pollution control prior to the introduction of trading schemes. It should be
kept in mind that the (institutional and regulatory) context may be different in other countries
or regions where trading schemes are being considered. Therefore, one should pay attention
not only to the experience with the trading schemes per se but also to the pre-conditions,
which may have facilitated or impeded trading. The remaining sections of this paper further
discuss strategies and relevant factors for the introduction of tradable permits schemes.
6 APPLYING TRADABLE POLLUTION RIGHTS IN WATER MANAGEMENT
6.1 Strategies for Introducing Tradable Pollution Rights Regimes
OECD (2001) discusses extensively the principal issues that arise when designing a tradable
permit system for natural resources within a country. For information on the overall design
and implementation of tradable permits for environmental management, the reader should
refer to this OECD study, which among others indicates the parameters and variables that
administrative and political decision-makers are recommended to take into account. Based
on the general framework for the design and implementation of tradable permits, this section
focuses on the specificity of water pollution trading. Outstanding issues that should be
considered for the introduction of tradable water pollution rights and relevant regulatory
aspects are discussed.
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To start with, experience shows that an existing functioning system of water pollution control
should be in place before introducing a market for tradable pollution permits. Such an
existing system can be either based on command-and-control instruments or other “less
sophisticated” market-based instruments such as charges. An existing functioning system
implies that a monitoring system is already established and can provide reliable
information/data on pollution loads, which is essential also for trading. Additional to good
monitoring, penalties for non-compliance must be immediate and high to ensure
enforcement. In a trading system, participants will buy rights if they think violation would be a
more costly alternative.
Further, strategies and sequences for the introduction and promotion of trading to control
water pollution may be designed making use of various “instrument mixes”. Actually, there is
a need for compatibility and coexistence between tradable permits and existing regulatory
instruments, in order to overcome the various forms of opposition that innovative policy may
encounter (Smith, 1999). Issues of compatibility and coexistence of instruments are
extensively discussed in section 6.3.
In general terms, several elements and factors should be discussed during the planning
phase of a tradable pollution rights programme, namely the kinds of pollutants that can be
traded, the geographic scope of the scheme, the eligibility criteria of the participants entering
the scheme, the types of trade desired (including point, non-point sources), any trading ratios
that may be appropriate in case non-point sources are included in the scheme (Nishizawa,
2003). A pilot phase for testing the trading scheme may be very useful for exploring and
dealing with all relevant issues before proceeding to nation-wide application.
The first step for the actual introduction of tradable discharge permits would be to shift from
technology controls on water pollution (which are actually rather rare), and towards controls
on emission. At the same time, water use permits should be linked to environmental quality
objectives, and water pollution permits should be based on loads, rather than on
concentrations. Care must be taken, however, to protect the water environment and other
water users from the acute effects of excessive concentrations of pollution due to trades (“hot
spots”). The first step requires the emergence of effective controls on the quantity and quality
of the effluents discharged, and the receiving waters themselves. The monitoring system
would need to be designed to provide data of such quality that they can be used in court for
the resolution of any conflicts arising from the use (or abuse) of tradable water pollution
rights (Kraemer and Bahnholzer, 1999). Regulators must provide safeguards to ensure that
overall environmental quality is maintained or enhanced while preserving the flexibility
necessary for pollutant trading. To avoid highly degraded localized areas, trading programs
must consider the location of potential partners in the watershed, the size of the watershed
where trading can occur, compliance records of trading participants, as well as enforcement
and monitoring issues (National Wildlife Federation, 1999).
A second step necessitates the definition of tradable rights, which may vary across different
types of pollution. If the system requires emissions to be measured, the conditions under
which these measurements take place need to be defined and standardized. If emissions
levels of individual firms are already monitored in the context of regulatory enforcement, it
may be possible to adapt existing measurement procedures for the introduction of a trading
system (Smith, 1999). From a regulatory perspective, it is common practice to establish a
cap on total emissions from a defined set of sources, which then allows participants to meet
the cap via market mechanisms. The establishment of a pollution cap can be the first step for
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developing a trading programme; the cap then reflects the maximum amount of pollution the
system can safely absorb.
Once the tradable rights are defined, they need to be initially allocated, and a mechanism for
allocation be established. The definition and allocation of tradable rights needs to take
account of the economics of water use and pollution control, as well as to anticipate the
responses of water users to the establishment of a tradable permit regime. The scheme
should be designed so as to involve a sufficient number of potential buyers and sellers.
There must also be sufficient room and opportunity to correct errors and to “fine-tune” the
allocation of rights, as well as the trading rules. Furthermore, the role of environmental and
market regulators needs to be defined, and rules for enforcement and sanctions need to be
established. In case trading includes non-point sources, difficulties with the enforceability and
monitoring of non-point source controls should be overcome before proceeding with trading
at a large scale. There is in most cases no regulation for non-point sources and therefore no
clear baseline against which to measure emissions reductions, nor is there an understanding
of how to monitor, enforce, and evaluate these polluting activities (Boyd et al, 2003). If non-
point sources are included in the trading scheme, regulators must consider the uncertainty
introduced into the trading pool; lessons can be learned from the case of the Lake Dillon
where a trading ratio between point and non-point sources was introduced (a point source
had to reduce two tons from non-point sources before it could increase its own discharge by
one ton).
Once a tradable permit regime is functioning, its continued ability to meet environmental and
resource requirements must periodically be evaluated, including its ability to respond
effectively to new (emerging) challenges. The regime should also be adaptable to account for
changes in the boundaries of the system, such as an expansion of the territorial coverage
and the emergence of unforeseen long-distance effects (Kraemer and Bahnholzer, 1999).
However, it needs to be considered that in order to guarantee security for tradable rights and
therefore willingness to trade, it is not advisable to unexpectedly revise the rules of the game;
it is advisable to avoid revising the rules in a way that might jeopardize investments already
made or might extensively challenge the value of permits. As part of a compromise between
permit security and programme adaptability, it is proposed to specify beforehand the
conditions under which the rules of the game may be changed in terms of timetable, changes
in caps and baselines, rules for the allocation of rights or an extension of the scheme
(OECD, 2001).
It is also important that “ground rules” about the relationship between trading and regulatory
limits be made sufficiently clear at the start of the system. Otherwise, potential participants in
trading may be discouraged for fear that trades could affect their subsequent treatment by
the regulatory authorities (for instance, in the case of the Fox River, the relationship between
trading and regulatory limits was not made sufficiently clear at the start of the system) (Smith,
1999).
6.2 Opportunities and Limitations
Additional to strategies for introducing tradable rights for water pollution control, this section
emphasizes factors, which may favor or impede the introduction of tradable pollution rights
regimes. It partly draws on the experience of the case studies presented in section 4.
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Among the key factors favoring trading are the following:
· Assurance and acceptance of rights in emissions and the accompanying trading rules
are, next to an effective administrative and legal system, seen as a prerequisite for a
functioning trading system. Assurance that the scheme will continue to function can be
promoted through the legal establishment of a scheme or other form of stable framework
and rules of the game. It is particularly advisable to avoid revising the rules in a way that
might jeopardize investments already made or might extensively challenge the value of
permits.
· Monitoring and reliable data are part of a solid basis for trading for various reasons
including enforcement mechanisms, information for conflict resolution, trade facilitation
and program evaluation.
· Clearly defined units of trade have proved important for setting up and running a trading
programme of emission rights.
· A thorough pilot phase for testing the rules and conditions of a trading scheme as well as
opportunity for consultation with potential participants can be vital for the acceptability
and success of a scheme (see case of salinity trading in Hunter River in Australia).
· Solid scientific understanding of the pollution factors and the behavior of the catchment in
question has obviously contributed to the functioning of most successful schemes with
water pollution trade so far.
· Trading can be stimulated when the market advantage is obvious to the trading
participants. For instance, the control of non-point sources is significantly cheaper than of
point sources. Point sources can thus pay non-point sources (cheaper control) to abate
water pollution.
On the other hand, a number of factors inhibit water trading, or the establishment of tradable
permit regimes in water management:
· Numerous administrative requirements, long approval procedures and restrictions to
trade may reduce willingness to trade.
· There can be technical obstacles for the establishment of trading for water pollution
control when there is insufficient knowledge of the behavior and changes in the pollution
load of the water system in question.
· Uncertainty about the legal viability of the “rights” created by tradable pollution permits
(see case of Fox River and legal challenge of trading when compared to the Clean Water
Act). For instance, the extent to which the reallocation of polluting emissions through
trading is compatible with other existing legislation may not be clear.
· The effects of water pollution are not independent of where and when this use occurs.
Any trading which shifts water use in space or time has to account for the consequences
on other water users or ecosystems. Trading of pollution rights can lead to so-called
pollution “hot spots”. While this does not make trading an impossible proposition, it may
constitute a severe restriction in certain situations.
· Water trading for water pollution control, as much as for water abstraction, can only occur
within restricted geographical zones with common ecological and institutional
significance, such as sub-river basins regulated by appropriate water institutions.
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The relative importance and consequences of all the above factors need to be assessed in
each case where existing water trading is analyzed, or where the establishment of tradable
permit regimes is being contemplated.
6.3 Compatibility of Tradable Pollution Permit Regimes in Instrument Mixes
Water resource protection and management involves in most cases the use of diverse
instrument mixes. This section explores in how far tradable pollution rights are compatible
with other important water management instruments (e.g. with taxes and charges or with
established principles of environmental policy) and how they can be integrated into the water
management, monitoring and enforcement systems already in place based to a great extent
on the relevant discussions of Kraemer and Bahnholzer (1999).
6.3.1 Compatibility with taxes and charges
Taxes and charges on water pollution are widely-used policy instruments in water resource
protection and management. In addition, there are normally also financial charges for water
services, notably water supply (incl. storage) and sewerage services. Water pollution taxes
or charges are normally based on the pollutants contained in effluent reaching the water
environment.
 One of the problems with tradable permit regimes in water management is that, in some
cases, the holders of rights are unaware of their entitlement, or cannot be encouraged to
trade. Imposing a tax or charge on “sleeping” water rights may effectively induce owners to
sell their unused water rights. A combination of tradable permits with taxes or charges can
have a number of other positive effects:
· It can help “sleeping” holders of rights to learn about the entitlements they own, thus
reducing the cost of entry into the market.
· It may impose a cost on speculative banking of rights, with its attendant risks for water
resource protection and management over time, and could have positive consequences
for the acceptance of tradable permit regimes.
· It can earn an environmental (or resource) rent that can be employed to carry out water
management functions that are in the public interest, thereby redressing persistent
environmental or resource externalities.
· It can induce the owners of rights to consider whether or not they need the whole
entitlement, or only a part of it, thereby inducing them to place fractions of their
entitlements on the market. This would lower the minimum quantity (and value) of trades
and supports the formation of marginal prices (market creation).
· By imposing a cost on the difference between the number of rights held and the actual
usage, taxes and charges can set an additional incentive to reduce pollution, as any
unused right then carries a price. In this way, a combination of tradable rights and taxes
or charges can stimulate innovation and even facilitate the “claw-back” of unused rights
for new auctions (thereby further lowering barriers to entry).
Taxes and charges, if applied in combination with environmental standards expressed in limit
values for concentrations or loads of pollutants, have a significant capacity-building effect,
both within the environmental enforcement agencies and with polluters (Kraemer, 1995c).
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This effect is mainly due to the information flows necessitated by economic instruments, as
well as to the incentive function. In light of the above list it would seem plausible to conclude
that tradable permit regimes and taxes or charges can be mutually-reinforcing.
6.3.2 Compatibility with environmental quality objectives (EQO)
Environmental quality objectives (EQO) are one of the most widely-used instruments in water
resource protection and management. EQOs are conceptually equivalent to “bubbles” and
are not only compatible with tradable permit systems, but may even be considered a
prerequisite in some cases. However, EQOs are not normally applied on their own, but are
usually in conjunction with a range of other instruments of monitoring and enforcement, with
which they are compatible. This does not mean that these other instruments, some of which
are addressed below, are themselves always compatible with trading within “bubbles”.
6.3.3 Compatibility with technology-derived standards (BAT)
Technology-derived standards, usually applied to pollution abatement and control, are often
seen as being inefficient, because they require the same abatement standard from every
polluter without regard to marginal abatement costs (or benefits). In addition they are often
seen as being incompatible with tradable permit systems. The assumption behind this
assessment is that technology standards (a prescription on abatement technologies to be
used) and technology-derived standards [e.g. pollution abatement parameters such as
emission limit values or a reduction percentage set with reference to the “best available
technology” (BAT)] are static, and cannot therefore accommodate the economically and
environmentally beneficial changes in pollution abatement that tradable permits might
induce.
In fact, the approach of using technology-derived standards aims at establishing a dynamic
process of continuous improvement in environmental performance. In principle, environ-
mental (emission) standards are expected to follow technological development, and to
provide for an ever-higher level of environmental protection. By setting standards on the
basis of BAT or some similar definition, regulators force all polluters with similar process or
abatement technologies to meet the same standards for new installations. Normally, existing
or “old” installations may be operated under previous, less stringent standards until the end
of their license period, which should coincide with the end of their economic or technical life.
Any installation built (and operated) later would then have to conform to the BAT in force at
the time.
In principle, it would be feasible to combine dynamic technology-derived standards with
tradable permits, as in the following scenario: at a time when the best available technology
changes, old installations are given a derogation period during which they may continue
operation, provided they hold permits to pollute. Such permits, which could be discounted
each year by 10 per cent of the original entitlement for instance, might then be sold by those
polluters who install better pollution control equipment (or shut down operations) to other
polluters who choose to continue operating their “old” installations. Such systems could be
introduced each time there is an improvement in the BAT, or when a significant difference
develops between the BAT and the (more stringent) “state of the art”.
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6.3.4 Compatibility with established principles of environmental policy
Tradable permit systems for water pollution control appear to be compatible with the
polluter-pays and the resource-user-pays principles, in that they impose a cost on water
pollution, or generate a reward for pollution abatement. Nor should there be any fundamental
problems with the principle that pollution effects should be prevented at the outset, rather
than mitigated later by compensation measures (prevention principle). Some countries also
subscribe to the “minimization principle”, according to which pollution should be reduced
even if no risk is demonstrated, as long as this is economically-bearable. This principle is
best applied through emission limit values, which may be based on technology standards
and, as discussed above, which may be combined with tradable permit systems.
The compatibility of tradable permit systems with the principle that pollution should be
reduced at source (rather than after dilution) appears to be weak. However, a successful
tradable permit system would direct resources at those sources of pollution where abatement
is most cost-effective, resulting in an optimal level of pollution reduction at source. In this
sense, tradable permit systems are compatible with this principle, if “source” is understood to
mean the sum of all sources (of similar characteristics).
An important tenet of environmental policy is that action should be taken to reduce risk as
soon as there are reasonable grounds to assume that a pollutant may be dangerous or
hazardous (precautionary principle). According to this principle, action may be taken if a risk
is demonstrated in the absence of a conclusive proof of causality (which may be impossible
to provide at the level of certainty usually expected in the natural sciences), and before the
associated risks can be fully assessed in terms of probability and likely damages (in nature,
value, and variance). The precautionary approach may call for significant changes in
pollution control as a consequence of new scientific insights. Care must be taken in the
design of tradable permit systems to ensure that they provide the necessary flexibility to
react to new challenges, since they might otherwise be incompatible with the precautionary
principle.
6.3.5 Tradable pollution permits within instrument mixes
It is obvious from the previous discussion that tradable permit systems for water pollution
control are, on the whole, compatible with most existing environmental policy principles and
instruments. It should therefore be possible to integrate tradable permit systems into existing
instrument mixes in a strategy of gradual improvement in environmental monitoring and
enforcement practices. It should be perhaps emphasized that, due to their nature, a tradable
permit system is a more demanding instrument in terms of enforcement, effective monitoring
and a system for settling disputes than other economic instruments for water pollution
control.
7 CONCLUSION AND OVERALL ASSESSMENT
This paper has provided a conceptual framework for the use of tradable permits in water
pollution control based on a selection of practical examples from the international arena. It
aimed to stimulate discussions at the Technical Seminar on the Feasibility of the Application
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of Tradable Water Permits for Water Management in Chile on 13-14 November 2003 in
Santiago de Chile (organized by the Inter-American Development Bank (IADB) and the
National Environment Commission of Chile (CONAMA)). In this final section, we draw
general conclusions based on the conceptual framework presented as well as more specific
conclusions on the case of Chile.
The paper has highlighted issues, which should be carefully considered for the planning,
design, and implementation of tradable emissions permits for water pollution control. A legal
framework establishing a trading scheme is desirable since it provides security for trading
and clear definitions. However, legal frameworks should be linked to the practical realities of
individual countries and regions and should bear in mind issues such as credible
enforcement and existing infrastructure (both administrative and technical). The roles of
administration should be clear to avoid overlapping mandates that could lead to long tedious
approval procedures for trades. Even more importantly, a well-designed monitoring system
should be in place to provide water quality data for the trading programme, as it has been
obvious from the practical examples presented in this paper. Pre-existing problems of
enforcement, for instance linked to standards for pollution control, should be settled before
introducing the possibility of trade. It is expected that trade can only function and contribute
to the improvement of water quality when it is considered a cheaper option, i.e. cheaper than
the violation of a permit limit.
The international experience shows that there are so far a few examples involving tradable
permits for water pollution control. It can be argued that markets in water pollution permits
are still in their experimental phases. Due to limited experience, there has also been limited
discussion so far about the effects of water pollution rights trading on the effectiveness of
environmental regulation. In particular, there appears to have been little discussion to date
on the possibilities of combining emission standards with tradable pollution permits, or on the
monitoring and adjustment needs where tradable permits are combined with environmental
regulation using environmental quality objectives (Kraemer and Bahnholzer, 1999).
Experience with tradable permits for water pollution control is accumulating primarily in
Australia and the US, which are both advanced economies with long regulatory history in
water management and pollution control. The introduction of trade for water pollution control
has benefited in these cases from solid scientific understanding of the pollution problems in
question, existing monitoring infrastructure and enforcement capacities.
Functioning schemes of water pollution trading tend to be intertwined with traditional
environmental management systems and strong (pre-existing) regulatory regimes. The latter
ensure both the effectiveness and the integrity of trading schemes, by providing a
(sometimes threatening) back-up of potential regulatory intervention. In this context, it may
be argued that a usual and potentially advisable sequence of instrument use for pollution
control is first command-and-control approaches, followed by market-based instruments
which are easier to introduce and implement than tradable permits (such as charges), finally
leading to the possibility of trading pollution permits.
It is also obvious from the international experience presented that experimentation with water
pollution trading has taken place so far only in federal countries (US, Australia). This could
be indicative of the flexibility (and freedom) provided in federal structures to experiment with
innovative instruments and adjust rules to the specific conditions of individual States. An
inflexible national framework could be limiting in this respect.
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Considering the conceptual framework of this paper and the discussions at the Technical
Seminar of IADB and CONAMA, we would like to conclude with some key observations on
the feasibility of tradable emissions permits for water pollution control in Chile.
Firstly, the issue of economic benefits from trading should be thoroughly considered. In order
to have a functioning market for tradable discharge permits, enough market participants
should exist. In the case of water pollution, this means that there should be many pollution
sources affecting the same parameter (e.g. N, P, BOD, salinity) within the same catchment.
Moreover, the different pollution sources must have different abatement cost curves so that
beneficial trades are possible.  The physical geography of Chile, characterized by short and
small river catchments, indicates that the ‘markets-to-be’ for tradable discharge permits may
be rather small. Thereby, the constrained market size will most probably lead to a lack of
efficiency and low likelihood of trades, as it was partly the case at the Fox River, US.
Secondly, as the international experience has revealed, a well-designed monitoring system is
necessary for water pollution trading. An ineffective environmental administration with low
capacity for enforcement and monitoring will be limiting in this respect.
It would need to be carefully ascertained whether and to what extent, the above
preconditions exist in Chile. Nevertheless, at this initial stage of evaluation, the authors of
this paper conclude that Chile does not appear to be a promising case for the application of
tradable permits to counteract water pollution. As an alternative, it is recommended that the
use of other economic instruments of a less demanding and simple design should be
explored for the purpose of water pollution control.
Finally, it is recommended that the draft law for tradable emission permits in Chile be
discussed broadly and that stakeholders (industry, agriculture, municipalities) are informed.
In this context, discussions and planning exercises should take place involving those that are
potential market participants. In other words, it is highly recommended to carry out in-depth
pilot studies in selected basins to test the rules and procedures of the planned trading
program. The experience from the pilot schemes can then be used as the basis for finalising
a functional legal framework. Pilot phases and programmes have proven very useful when
planning emissions trading schemes elsewhere so far. Both in Australia (case of salinity
trading in the Hunter River) and the US, long-term pilot schemes have contributed to
thorough testing of trading rules and have given the possibility for consultation and exchange
with stakeholders and potential participants in advance. Early information and clarification of
rules and potential impacts of the schemes can significantly improve the efficiency of the
formal, legally established scheme.
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